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Abstract
There is a split of judicial authority on whether limited liability applies when the creditor is a
partner of a limited liability partnership. The New York Court of Appeals narrowly interpreted the
partnership statute and denied the applicability, but the California Court of Appeals upheld it. The
difference has been overlooked by the legal and business communities. This paper shows that the
narrow interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative intent, laden with procedural obstacles in
enforcement, and inharmonious with settled legal doctrines and tenets of law-making.

*

Lynn Bai is Professor of Law at University of Cincinnati College of Law. Sarah Harden is
Corporate Law Fellow of the Corporate Law Center at the University of Cincinnati College of
Law. The authors thank participants of the faculty workshop at the College of Law for their
valuable comments, and Rachel Levin for her careful editing.
1

Table of Contents
I Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3
II Opposing Views .................................................................................................................. 7
A.

New York’s View ................................................................................................................................................... 7

B.

California’s View ................................................................................................................................................ 10

III Legal Inconsistencies under the Narrow Interpretation of Limited Liability ....................... 12
A.

Inconsistency with the Legislative Intent ............................................................................................................ 12

B.

Inconsistency with Waiver Provisions of LLP Statutes ....................................................................................... 17

C.

Inconsistency with the “Clean Severance” Ideal................................................................................................ 21

D.

Inconsistency with the Law of Guaranty ............................................................................................................. 23

IV Procedural Impediments to Enforcing Personal Liability ................................................... 25
A.

Due Process Requirement ................................................................................................................................... 25

B.

Bankruptcy Trustee’s Standing ........................................................................................................................... 28

C.

A Partner’s Standing to Petition for an Involuntary Bankruptcy ....................................................................... 29

V Contradictions to Accepted Wisdoms of Law-Making ........................................................ 30
A.

Good Law as Gap-Filler for Private Ordering ................................................................................................... 30

B.

Guiding Principles for Setting Default Rules ..................................................................................................... 32

C.

Shortfalls of the Narrow Interpretation of Limited Liability............................................................................... 35

VI Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 42

2

I Introduction
Limited liability partnership (LLP) is a popular form of business association for licensed
professionals such as lawyers, accountants, architects, and doctors. 1 At least 85% of the top 350
law firms in the U.S. are formed as LLPs, and the rest are mostly professional corporations or
professional associations. 2 The fundamental attribute of these business forms is limited liability
that purportedly shields the personal assets of the owners from the reach of the creditors of the
business entities.
The first LLP legislation was born in 1991 in Texas, shortly after the savings and loan crisis
in which more than 1,000 such institutions failed due their imprudence in lending and the resulting
vulnerability to surging inflation. 3 A deluge of lawsuits were filed against law firms and their
partners who allegedly helped the thrift institutions circumvent lending limits and other regulations
designed to prevent excessive risk-taking. 4 The law firms were organized as general partnerships,
which meant each partner was vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of other partners despite
lacking any personal involvement, even newly minted partners owning insignificant shares of the
partnerships. 5 The chilling effect of vicarious liability spurred the efforts of the partners of a
twenty-one person Texas law firm to change the partnership law. The Texas legislature was

1

See Ronald Mallen, Legal Malpractice § 5:24 (Jan. 2020) (“The limited liability partnership (‘LLP’) is the newest
form of a law firm business structure and is now recognized in every state. The LLP has become the entity of choice,
as statutes and court rules have extended its availability.”). See also Why Choose a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)?,
NOLO , https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/why-choose-limited-liability-partnership-llp.html.
2
See America’s 350 Largest Law Firms, PUBLICLEGAL (July 2019), https://www.ilrg.com/nlj250?.
(Notice that almost all of the first largest 100 law firms have LLP attached to their names. The report does not show
organization types for law firms that rank above 100. We randomly selected fifty of these firms and manually checked
their organization forms. We found that at least 85% of the firms are LLPs.).
3
See The S&L Crisis, A Chrono-Bibliography, FDIC (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/sandl/.
4
See Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev.53. See also Linda P.
Campbell, U.S. Suing Lawyers to Recoup S&L Losses, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 20, 1989),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1989-11-20-8903110242-story.html.
5
See Sharon Walsh, Am I My Partner's Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev., 329, 329 n.2 (1995).
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persuaded to enact the first LLP statute in the nation, 6 followed soon by Louisiana and Delaware. 7
Within a few years, the movement away from general partnerships and toward limited liability
partnerships swept the U.S. 8 Now LLP as a form of business entity is recognized in every
jurisdiction. 9
To form an LLP, a certificate of limited liability partnership must be filed with a chosen
state. This registration subjects the LLP to the partnership law of the state. Most states’ LLP
statutes model after the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), a sample statute drafted in
1997 and most recently revised in 2013 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. 10 While most provisions of this model statute apply to general partnerships, some
provisions specifically relate to limited liability partnerships. Section 306 (c) of RUPA provides
in part: “A debt, obligation, or other liability of a partnership incurred while the partnership is a
limited liability partnership is solely the debt, obligation, or other liability of the limited liability
partnership. A partner is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or
otherwise, for a debt, obligation, or other liability of the limited liability partnership solely by
reason of being or acting as a partner.” 11
Most jurisdictions follow the RUPA in applying the liability shield broadly to both tort
claims and contractual debts, while some jurisdictions use the shield narrowly for tort claims
only. 12 Limited liability prevents a partner from being sued vicariously due to his association with

6

Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield Of Unintended Consequences--The Traps of Limited Liability
Law Firms, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 717, 724 (1997).
7
See Mallen, supra note 1 (“Louisiana was the second state to pass LLP legislation, and then Delaware.”)
8
Fortney, supra note 6, at 718, 718 n.38 (“The accounting profession, led by the Accountants' Coalition, joined the
push for enactment of LLP legislation.”).
9
Mallen, supra note 1.
10
UNIF. P’SHIP. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) [hearafter RUPA].
11
Id. at §306(c).
12
See Id. at cmt.c at Full Liability Shield, (“This act provides a full liability shield – i.e., the shield applies regardless
of the law giving rise to a claim against an LLP. A few jurisdictions provide only a partial shield. See, e.g., 15 PA.
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the actual wrongdoer, but continues to hold the latter personally liable. 13 In 2007, the New York
Court of Appeals gave an even narrower interpretation of the liability shield in Ederer v. Gursky, 14
by holding that limited liability did not apply to debts owed to a partner of the firm. Subsequent
New York cases followed this precedent. 15 In contrast, a case decided by a California Court of
Appeals in 2011 held that limited liability barred a claim by one partner against other partners for
debts owed by the partnership. 16 This issue has not been considered by courts in other jurisdictions.
Whether or not debts owed to partners are protected by limited liability is critically
important. Currently there is a general understanding among lawyers and business participants that
liability of LLP partners is limited regardless of the status of the creditors. Statements like “One
big advantage to a limited liability partnership is that the partners are not personally liable and
cannot be forced to pay a business debt or liability with personal property or assets” are present on
websites of law firms, popular legal search platforms, and even in articles featured by the American
Bar Association. 17 Ederer v. Gursky, if widely followed, would render such advice detrimentally
misleading.

CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8204 (West 2013)”). See also, Christine M. Przybysz, Shielded beyond State Limits:
Examining Conflict-of-Law Issues in Limited Liability Partnerships, 54 CASE W.LAW REV., Issue 2, 605, 606.
13
RUPA supra note 10 at cmt. C at Full Liability Shield (“This subsection provides a corporate/LLC-like liability
shield for partners, protecting them from (and only from) the debts, obligations and liabilities of the partnership – i.e.,
against a partner’s alleged vicarious liability for the obligations of the entity.”).
14
Ederer v. Gursky, 881 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2007).
15
Kuslansky v. Kuslansky, Robbins, Stechel and Cunningham, LLP, 50 A.D.3d 1100 (2008); Grewal v. Cuneo, 2016
WL 308803 (S.D. NY 2016).
16
Rappaport v. Gelfand, 197 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1213 (2011).
17
See, e.g., Advantages of Limited Liability Partnerships, LEGALMATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/lawlibrary/article/advantages-of-limited-liability-partnerships.html; Limited Liability Partnership – LLP formations,
Benefits of an LLP, SIMPLE FORMATIONS, https://www.simpleformations.com/llp-benefits-and-disadvantages.htm;
Meredith Hart, What's an LLP? Limited Liability Partnerships Explained in Under 5 Minutes, HUBSPOT,
https://blog.hubspot.com/sales/limited-liability-partnership; Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability
Partnerships: The Next Step in the Evolution of the Unincorporated Business Organization, 61 BUS. LAW. 147
(Nov. 1995) (“An LLP is a general partnership in which the vicarious liability of the partners for the obligations of
the partnership has been limited).
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The scope of liability is an important consideration in the selection of a business form. As
discussed later in this article, members of limited liability companies (LLC) are shielded by limited
liability even for debts owed by the LLC to other members. That means the protection granted to
LLC members is markedly broader than that to LLP partners in a jurisdiction that follows Ederer
v. Gursky. However, in comparing LLCs with LLPs, lawyers have overlooked this distinction and
frequently opined that the two forms are equal in the liability protection. 18 Such misinformation
has also appeared in documents of influential organizations such as the Uniform Law
Commission.19
The narrow interpretation of limited liability as endorsed by Ederer v. Gursky (hereinafter,
the “Narrow Interpretation”) has hitherto eluded the attention of the legal and business
communities. If duly noticed, it likely will impact partnerships’ management structures and
business decisions. For example, partners may insist on a unanimous vote if a decision can
remotely lead to any indebtedness to a partner, even on matters that are otherwise “ordinary” and
worthy of a mere majority vote under the RUPA. The partners may vote to buy out the interests of
wrongfully dissociated partners instead of exercising their statutory right of postponement to avoid
incurring a personal liability for the buyout price. The partners may also forego business
expansions to preserve capital for paying off loans from fellow partners, even though the
expansions serve the best interest of the partnership.

18

See, e.g., Jane Haskins, Esq., Advantages and Disadvantages of LLC vs. LLP, LEGALZOOM,
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/advantages-and-disadvantages-of-llc-vs-llp, (“Both an LLC and an LLP help
business owners limit their personal liability. In both types of businesses, owners may lose the money they've invested
in the company, but their personal assets aren't at risk if the business or a co-owner is sued. LLC members and LLP
partners always remain personally responsible for their own wrongful actions.”).
19
See UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) Prefatory Note to ULLCA (2006),
(stating that in jurisdictions that limit liability for both tort and contract based claims, “LLPs and member-managed
LLCs offer entrepreneurs very similar attributes and, in the case of professional service organizations, LLPs may
dominate the field”).
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The purpose of this paper is to alert the legal and business communities about the Narrow
Interpretation of limited liability and to argue against it. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows: Part II discusses the opposing views held by courts on the scope of limited liability for
LLPs; Part III shows that the Narrow Interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative intent and
other provisions of partnership statutes, and contradictory to established doctrines on guaranty;
Part IV discusses the procedural impediments to enforcing personal liabilities under the Narrow
Interpretation; Part V argues that the Narrow Interpretation defies widely-accepted tenets of lawmaking that exalt efficiency, information sharing, low agency costs, meeting reasonable
expectations of interested parties, harm prevention and cost internalization; and Part VI concludes
this paper.

II Opposing Views
A. New York’s View
Eder v. Gursky involved a law firm that started in 1998 as a professional corporation (PC)
with one owner (Gursky) and a salaried non-equity employee (Ederer). Later, Gursky orally agreed
to make Ederer a 30% shareholder of the PC. The two owners registered an LLP in 2001 to
continue the legal practice. The PC billed and collected work-in-progress and pre-existing accounts
receivable, while the LLP billed all new legal services. Ederer received his share of the PC’s profit
in 2001 and 2002. In 2002, both Ederer and Gursky loaned the PC a portion of their shares of the
PC's profits. These loans were later assumed by the LLP in exchange for the furniture, fixtures and
equipment that it acquired from the PC. 20 Three new partners were later admitted to the LLP.

20

Ederer, 881 N.E.2d at 517.
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Ederer, Gursky, and the new partners (collectively) held 30%, 55%, and 15% interest of the LLP.21
There was no written partnership agreement. 22
In June 2003, Ederer sought to withdraw from the PC and the LLP when the business was
cash-strapped and unprofitable. 23 He entered into an agreement with the PC and LLP, which
agreements were signed by Gursky as the President of the PC and a partner of the LLP. 24 Under
these agreements, Ederer agreed to temporarily remain a partner of the LLP so as to continue
serving as the lead counsel for a trial scheduled to commence soon. In exchange, the LLP agreed
to compensate him according to existing arrangements until the time of his final departure. 25
Ederer won the case and generated a $600,000 contingency fee for the LLP. Ederer then departed,
at which time the LLP still owed him the following debts: (1) his share of the PC’s profit from an
earlier year, (2) his share of the contingency fee for the case won immediately prior to his departure,
and (3) the loan he made in 2002 by reducing the distribution of his profit share in the PC. In
December 2003, Ederer brought a lawsuit against the PC, the LLP, and each of the LLP’s partners
individually for, among others, breach of contract relating to these debts. 26 The individual partners
moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that New York Partnership Law Section 26 (b) shielded
them from personal liability. 27 The trial court ruled for Ederer, and the partners appealed.

21

Id.
Id. at 516.
23
Id. at 517.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 518.
27
Id.
22
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Section 26 of the New York Partnership Law 28 was added to the statute in 1994, following
the national trend of limiting vicarious liabilities for partnerships that are registered as LLPs. 29
Specifically, Section 26 (b) 30 provides:
Except as provided by subdivisions (c) and (d) of this section, no partner of a
partnership which is a registered limited liability partnership is liable or accountable,
directly or indirectly (including by way of indemnification, contribution or
otherwise), for any debts, obligations or liabilities of, or chargeable to, the
registered limited liability partnership or each other, whether arising in tort, contract
or otherwise, which are incurred, created or assumed by such partnership while
such partnership is a registered limited liability partnership, solely by reason of
being such a partner.
Section 26 (c) excludes from Section 26 (b)'s liability shield any person who is in a direct
supervisory role of the person who committed the wrongdoing. 31 Section 26 (d) allows partners to
opt out from or modify Section 26 (b)'s protection by agreement. 32
The partners argued that the plain language of Section 26 (b) precluded their personal
liability for debts owed by the partnership to Ederer. In rebuking this argument, the New York
Court of Appeals relied primarily on the structure of the New York Partnership Law that includes

28

N.Y. Partnership Law art. 3 § 26 (LexisNexis 2020).
Ederer, 881 N.E.2d at 522 – 23.
30
N.Y. Partnership Law supra note 28 at art. 3 § 26(b).
31
This section provides in part: “Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision(b) of this section, (i) each partner,
employee or agent of a partnership which is a registered limited liability partnership shall be personally and fully liable
and accountable for any negligent or wrongful act or misconduct committed by him or her or by any person under his
or her direct supervision and control while rendering professional services on behalf of such registered limited liability
partnership."
32
Section 26(d) provides in part: “Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision(b) of this section, all or specified
partners of a partnership which is a registered limited liability partnership may be liable in their capacity as partners
for all or specified debts, obligations or liabilities of a registered limited liability partnership to the extent at least a
majority of the partners shall have agreed unless otherwise provided in any agreement between the partners.”
29
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§ 26 as part of Article 3 (“Relations of Partners to Persons Dealing with the Partnership”) as
opposed to Article 4 (“Relations of Partners to One Another”). The court concluded: “The logical
inference, therefore, is that ‘any debts’ refers to any debts owed a third party, absent very clear
legislative direction to the contrary.” 33 The court also sought to strengthen its opinion by
highlighting the fact that New York was among few jurisdictions that had adopted limited liability
at the time for both tort and contract-based claims of a vicarious nature. In the court’s opinion,
there was no basis for further stretching this extraordinary generosity to the extent argued by the
partners. 34
The New York Court of Appeals repeated its position on this issue in Kuslansky v.
Kuslansky, Robbins, Stechel and Cunningham, LLP, 35 which involved a lawsuit for breach of
contract brought by a withdrawing partner of a medical practice LLP against the LLP and the other
partners individually for compensation owed to the plaintiff. Citing Ederer v. Gursky, the court
refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim against individual partners on the ground that limited
liability is not intended to preclude personal liability for debts owed to fellow partners. 36
B. California’s View
The California Appellate Court holds the opposite view. In Rappaport v. Gelfand, 37a law
firm LLP had three partners, holding 31% (Rappaport), 46% (Gelfand), and 23% (the third partner),
respectively. Rappaport withdrew from the partnership and demanded compensation for his share

33

Ederer, 881 N.E.2d at 524.
Id. at 525 (pointing out that unlike New York, most states had adopted a partial liability shield protecting the partners
only from vicarious tort liabilities at the time of the litigation).
35
Kuslansky, 50 A.D.3d 1100.
36
Id. at 1101 (“The Court of Appeals recently made clear that the "liability shield" created by Partnership Law § 26
(b) for general partners of a registered limited liability partnership only applies to "a partner's liability to third parties,
and, in fact, is part of article 3 of the Partnership Law ('Relations of Partners to Persons Dealing with the Partnership'),
not article 4 ('Relations of Partners to One Another')" (Ederer v Gursky, 9 NY3d 514, 524 [2007]). Thus, Partnership
Law § 26 (b) "does not shield a general partner in a registered limited liability partnership from personal liability for
breaches of the partnership's or partners' obligations to each other" (Ederer v Gursky, 9 NY3d at 516).”).
37
Rappaport v. Gelfand, 197 Cal.App.4th 1213 (2011).
34
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of the partnership’s assets. The major assets of the LLP included general accounts receivable,
possible recovery of a contingency fee from representing clients in a lawsuit, and receivables from
four separate litigation matters on behalf of a client. 38 The trial court found that Rapport was
entitled to $230,758 from the partnership for his buyout, and that the partnership as well as the
other two partners individually were liable for this payment. 39 The appellate court reversed the
personal liability of the other partners based on California Corporations Code, Title 2. Partnerships,
Section 16306 (c). This section provides:
Notwithstanding any other section of this chapter, and subject to subdivisions (d),
(e), (f), and (h), a partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not liable or
accountable, directly or indirectly, including by way of indemnification,
contribution, assessment, or otherwise, for debts, obligations, or liabilities of or
chargeable to the partnership or another partner in the partnership, whether arising
in tort, contract, or otherwise, that are incurred, created, or assumed by the
partnership while the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership, by
reason of being a partner or acting in the conduct of the business or activities of the
partnership.
Section 16306(d) allows the partners to opt out of or modify the limited liability protection by
agreement in writing, 40 Section 16306(e) clarifies that partners remain personally liable for their

38

Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1224.
40
Cal. Corp. Code § 16306(d) (2020) provides: “Notwithstanding subdivision (c), all or certain specified partners of
a registered limited liability partnership, if the specified partners agree, may be liable in their capacity as partners for
all or specified debts, obligations, or liabilities of the registered limited liability partnership if the partners possessing
a majority of the interests of the partners in the current profits of the partnership, or a different vote as may be required
in the partnership agreement, specifically agreed to the specified debts, obligations, or liabilities in writing, prior to
the debt, obligation, or liability being incurred.”
39
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own tortious conducts, 41 Section 16306(f) states that law firms must maintain an effective
registration with the California State Bar in order to benefit from the liability shield, 42 and Section
16306(h) provides that any partner may choose to act as a surety or guarantor and subject himself
to personal liability as such. 43 Since the plaintiff failed to establish personal liability under these
explicit exceptions, the appellate court concluded that personal liability was barred by Section
16306(c). 44 Although the California statute mimics the New York statute in both semantics and
structure - Section 16306 is contained in Article 3 (“Relations of Partners to Persons Dealing with
Partnership”) as opposed to Article 4 (“Relations of Partners to Each Other and to Partnership”) the comparable statutes have led to opposite conclusions by courts in these two jurisdictions. The
discussion below shows why New York’s Narrow Interpretation is wrong.

III Legal Inconsistencies under the Narrow Interpretation of Limited Liability
A. Inconsistency with the Legislative Intent
Most LLP statutes enacted by state legislatures adopt the language of Section 306(c) of the
RUPA almost verbatim by stating that LLP partners are “not personally liable, directly or indirectly,
by way of contribution or otherwise, for a debt, obligation, or other liability of the limited liability
partnership…”

45

While this language does not explicitly deal with debts owed to co-partners, the

41

Cal. Corp. Code § 16306(e) provides: “Nothing in subdivision (c) shall be construed to affect the liability of a
partner of a registered limited liability partnership to third parties for that partner s tortious conduct.”
42
Cal. Corp. Code § 16306(f) provides: “The limitation of liability in subdivision (c) shall not apply to claims based
upon acts, errors, or omissions arising out of the rendering of professional limited liability partnership services of a
registered limited liability partnership providing legal services unless that partnership has a currently effective
certificate of registration issued by the State Bar.”
43
Cal. Corp. Code § 16306(h) provides: “Nothing in this section shall affect or impair the ability of a partner to act as
a guarantor or surety for, provide collateral for or otherwise be liable for, the debts, obligations, or liabilities of a
registered limited liability partnership.”
44
Rappaport, 197 Cal.App.4th at 1232.
45
Florida, Connecticut, Colorado, Maryland, and Minnesota have also incorporated the Uniform Partnership Act being
into their statutes like New York and California. See, e.g., (Florida) Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Fla. Stat. Ann.
§§ 620.81001 — 620.9902 (Lexis 2020), Connecticut Uniform Partnership Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. Section 34-
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Uniform Law Commission that drafted the RUPA has elucidated on its intention in a few
commentaries. In Comment to Subsection (c) of Section 306, under “Shield Applicable Regardless
of the Identity of the Plaintiff”, 46 the Commission states:
What makes the shield relevant is the nature of the claim. If the complaint seeks to
hold a partner vicariously liable for the LLP’s obligations, the shield applies. If not,
not. Thus, there is no distinction among a claim arising from an LLP’s debt to a
commercial creditor, a partner’s claim that the LLP has failed to return a
contribution as required by the partnership agreement, and a claim by a former
partner that the LLP has failed to follow through on a buy-out agreement.
This explanatory comment is consistent with the Uniform Law Commission’s manifested
intent to “provide a corporate/LLC-like liability shield for partners, protecting them from (and only
from) the debts, obligations and liabilities of the partnership – i.e., against a partner’s alleged
vicarious liability for the obligations of the entity.” 47 Numerous sources have also acknowledged
that such a motivation is behind state LLP legislations that provide a full liability shield for both
tort and contract claims. 48 While New York legislative documents do not contain any explicit

327(c), Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), Section 7-64-306(3) (cited as CO Rev Stat § 7-64-306 (2016)),
Maryland Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Section 9A-306(c), Minnesota Uniform Partnership Act, Section
323A.0306(c).
46
See RUPA supra note 10.
47
See Id. at §306 cmt. See also Why Your State Should Adopt the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) (1997) (Last
Amended 2013), Unif. Law Comm’n, (“Limited Liability Partnerships. UPA (1997) provides limited liability
protection for general partners of a limited liability partnership. … However, individual partners like shareholders in
a corporation, are personally liable for any tort they may have committed, or for any debts, liabilities or other
obligations of the partnership they have personally guaranteed”) (emphasis added).
48
See David B. Rae, Limited Liability Partnerships, The Time to Become One is Now, 30-Feb. HOUS. LAW. 47, 47
(Jan./Feb. 1993) (“LLPs enjoy certain specific benefits of corporate limited liability while still retaining the tax
advantage of a general partnership. LLPs are a reaction to limited liability companies (LLCs) and are intended to
give partnerships some of the protection afforded LLCs without forcing partnerships to alter their structure to
achieve the protection.”). See also Robert Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth
(Nearly), 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1065, 1087 (Fall 1995). (“This [broad-shield] version of the LLP essentially
eliminates all personal liability of partners for partnership obligations to the same extent that liability is eliminated

13

statement about the applicability of limited liability to debts owed to co-partners, the court in
Ederer v. Gursky acknowledged that the legislature desired to enact a liability protection “the same
as that accorded to shareholders of a professional corporation organized under the [Business
Corporation Law] [and] as that accorded to members of a professional LLC.” 49 Again, it is worth
noting that the New York LLP statute follows the same structure as the RUPA by including the
limited liability provision in Article 3 (“Relations of Partners to Persons Dealing with Partnership”)
as opposed to Article 4 (“Relations of Partners to Each Other and to Partnership”). Yet the same
structure prompted the New York court to construe a much narrower scope of limited liability than
that intended by the Uniform Law Commission. In addition, the New York Partnership Law § 26(c)
explicitly carves out an exception to limited liability by holding partners personally liable for the
wrongdoing of people who are under their direct supervision. 50 This suggests that if the New York
legislature intended to preclude debts owed to partners from the coverage of limited liability, it
likely would have explicitly stated so in the statute.
Are LLC members personally liable for debts owed by the LLC to fellow members? Every
state has enacted its own LLC statute, and about half of those statutes model after the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA). The ULLCA was promulgated by the Uniform Law
Commission in 1994 and amended in 1996 and 2006. 51 Section 304 (a) of the ULLCA provides:

under the limited liability company statute.”). In re Rambo Imaging, L.L.P., No. 07-11190-FRM, 2008 WL
2778846, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex., July 15, 2008) (“‘Corporation’ is defined in the Bankruptcy Code to include a
‘partnership association organized under a law that makes only the capital subscribed responsible for the debts for
such association.’ 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A)(ii). By defining “corporation” to include such partnerships, Congress
apparently intended that such limited liability partnerships would be treated as corporations and not as partnerships
under the Code.”)
49
Ederer, supra note 14 at 524.
50
N.Y. Partnership Law supra note 28 at §26(c)(i): “[E]ach partner, employee or agent of a partnership which is a
registered limited liability partnership shall be personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or
wrongful act or misconduct committed by him or her or by any person under his or her direct supervision and control
while rendering professional services on behalf of such registered limited liability partnership.”
51
UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT, supra note 19.
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The debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a limited liability company, whether
arising in contract, tort, or otherwise: (1) are solely the debts, obligations, or other
liabilities of the company; and (2) do not become the debts, obligations, or other
liabilities of a member or manager solely by reason of the member acting as a
member or manager acting as a manager.
The Uniform Law Commission’s Comment to § 304 states that the relevant consideration under
this section is the nature of the claim and that “there is no distinction between a claim arising from
an LLC’s debt to a commercial creditor, a member’s claim that the LLC has failed to return a
contribution as required by the operating agreement, and a claim by a former member that the LLC
has failed to follow through on a buyout agreement.” 52 There is a discernable similarity between
ULLCA § 304(a) and RUPA § 306(c), as well as the Uniform Law Commission’s comments to
both provisions.
The New York Limited Liability Law 53 parallels the ULLCA for liability of LLC members.
Section 609 (a) of the New York statute provides that a member or manager of an LLC is not
“liable for any debts, obligations or liabilities of the limited liability company or each other,
whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise, solely by reason of being such member, manager or
agent or acting (or omitting to act) in such capacities or participating (as an employee, consultant,
contractor or otherwise) in the conduct of the business of the limited liability company.” 54 This
language resembles closely the limited liability provision of § 26 (b) of the New York Partnership
Law. 55

52

Id. at 84.
N. Y. Ltd. Liab. Co. Law (McKinney 2020).
54
Id. at §609(a).
55
N.Y. Partnership Law supra note 28 at art. 3 § 26(b).
53
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Courts across jurisdictions have consistently held that LLC members are not personally
liable for debts owed by the LLC to any member. In Demir v. Schollmeier, 56 an LLC had two
members who signed an agreement that provided for the return of the second member’s capital
contribution of $400,000 should he withdraw from the LLC. When the second member sought a
return of this amount upon his departure and was refused, he brought a lawsuit against the LLC
and the other member for breach of contract. The Florida Court of Appeals held that the contract
constituted the LLC’s operating agreement as opposed to a personal agreement. Based on Florida’s
LLC statute that negated any personal liability of members “solely by reason of being a member
or serving as a manager or managing member,” 57 the court held that the remaining member of the
LLC was not personally liable for the return of this contribution and was improperly included as a
defendant in the lawsuit. 58 The same view was held by the Louisiana Court of Appeals in Fancher
v. Prudhome, 59 and the Texas Court of Appeals in Kennebrew v. Harris. 60 Both cases involved a
departing LLC member suing the LLC and other members for money owed, in the form of return
of capital, repayment of loans or compensation for membership interest.
A similar conclusion was reached by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division in
Hakim v. Hakim. 61 In that case, an uncle established an LLC to lease real estate in Manhattan, New
York. The uncle signed an options agreement with his nephew for the latter to purchase up to onethird membership interest in the LLC. The nephew later sought to exercise the option, but despite
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Demir v. Schollmeier, 199 So.3d 442, (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016).
Fla. Stat. §608.4227(1), (2012), provides: “Except as provided in this chapter, the members, managers, and
managing members of a limited liability company are not liable, solely by reason of being a member or serving as a
manager or managing member, under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt,
obligation, or liability of the limited liability company.” Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 2013-180, § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2015;
Laws 2015, c. 2015-148, § 11. Copy of the 2012 version https://www.flsenate.gov/laws/statutes/2012/608.4227.
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Demir, 199 So.3d at 443.
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Fancher v. Prudhome, 112 So.3d 909 (La. Ct. 2d. App. Feb. 27, 2013).
60
Kennebrew v. Harris, 425 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App. Mar. 4, 2014).
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Hakim v. Hakim, 99 A.D.3d 498 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st . Oct. 11, 2012).
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his repeated requests, the uncle delayed the execution of an operating agreement and refused to
provide an accounting necessary for the exercise of the option. Meanwhile, the nephew performed
an array of work on behalf of the LLC, holding himself out as a member of the LLC with the
uncle’s acquiescence. When the uncle denied the nephew’s formal request for a recognition of his
membership in the LLC, the nephew brought a lawsuit against the LLC and the uncle for quantum
meruit and unjust enrichment. The court held that the evidence showed an unambiguous promise
to provide long overdue information for the nephew to complete the exercise of his option, and
that the uncle gave an unqualified acknowledgement of the validity of nephew’s option-based
interest in the LLC. However, the court, while sustaining the cause of action against the LLC,
denied the claim against the uncle personally on the ground that the nephew’s uncompensated
services were debts of the LLC, and not of the uncle individually. 62
Given the legislative intent to equalize LLP partners with LLC members in terms of
liability protection, and judicial opinions unequivocally holding that limited liability applies to
LLC members irrespective of the status of the creditors, the Narrow Interpretation of the LLP
statute to exclude debts owed to LLP partners from the coverage of limited liability contravenes
the legislative intent.
B. Inconsistency with Waiver Provisions of LLP Statutes
The LLP status, whether obtained at the inception of the business or upon conversion from
a general partnership, impacts the inter se relationship among partners. Regardless of the form it
takes, a partnership is required to indemnify and hold harmless partners for liabilities incurred
while they act on behalf of the partnership. 63 At the same time, the partnership agreement may
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Id. at 502.
RUPA supra note 10 at §401(c) (“A partnership shall indemnify and hold harmless a person with respect to any
claim or demand against the person and any debt, obligation, or other liability incurred by the person by reason of the
63
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obligate partners to contribute more capital should the partnership’s assets be insufficient to meet
its obligations. 64 Without clarification, such indemnification and contribution provisions could
have been used to circumvent the protection of limited liability bestowed by the LLP statute. For
example, a surgeon-partner of a medical LLP is sued for $10 million for a surgical accident. He
pays the entire amount and seeks indemnification from the LLP. If the LLP lacks enough assets to
honor its obligation, it could potentially call for additional contribution from the other partners so
the money could be forwarded to the surgeon. Likewise, if the LLP borrows from a creditor but
has no assets to repay the loan, it could potentially call for contribution. Such a result renders all
partners personally liable for partnership obligations and defeats the purpose of limited liability.
To prevent a de facto nullification of limited liability through the indemnification and
contribution provisions, RUPA § 306 (c) (and state statutes that model after the RUPA) explicitly
states that LLP partners are not vicariously liable “directly or indirectly, through contribution or
otherwise.” 65 That means creditors cannot compel an LLP to call for additional capital from its
partners for the purpose of repaying its debts. 66 It also means the indemnification provision

person’s former or present capacity as a partner, if the claim, demand, debt, obligation, or other liability does not arise
from the person’s breach of this section or Section 407 or 409”). See also N.Y. Partnership Law supra note 28 at §40
(2) (“Except as provided in subdivision (b) of section twenty-six of this chapter, the partnership must indemnify every
partner in respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper
conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its business or property”), and Cal. Corp. Code § 16401(c) (“A
partnership shall reimburse a partner for payments made and indemnify a partner for liabilities incurred by the partner
in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or for the preservation of its business or property”).
64
RUPA supra note 10 at §404 provides: ((a) A person’s obligation to make a contribution to a partnership is not
excused by the person’s death, disability, termination, or other inability to perform personally. (b) If a person does not
fulfill an obligation to make a contribution other than money, the person is obligated at the option of the partnership
to contribute money equal to the value of the part of the contribution which has not been made. (c) The obligation of
a person to make a contribution may be compromised only by the affirmative vote or consent of all the partners….”).
65
For examples of state statutes, see Florida supra note 45.
66
RUPA supra note 10 at § 306 cmt. subsec. (c), Effect of LLP Status on Relations Inter Se the Partners (“Except for
contributions promised but not made, partners no longer have contribution obligations Due to: • the liability shield,
partners are no longer required to contribute capital to enable the partnership to meet its obligations to creditors; and
• the elimination of loss sharing, partners are no longer required to contribute capital to adjust capital losses inter se.
In this context, a partnership's obligations include a duty to indemnify partners (and others). Thus, indemnification
provisions (whether as provided by this act, Section 401(c), or the partnership agreement) are no longer “backstopped”
by the partners. See the comment to Subsection (c)(1).”)
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reimburses a partner who has paid more than his proportional share of liability only to the extent
of the existing assets of the partnership. 67 The registration for an LLP status is regarded as a
modification of any pre-existing agreement that is inconsistent with the nature of limited liability.68
To ensure that partners understand the consequences of the change, the law requires that an LLP
registration be approved by the vote that is necessary to amend the contribution provisions if such
provisions are part of the partnership agreement. 69
The statutory protection of limited liability can be modified or waived by partners, but only
knowingly and intentionally. 70 Some jurisdictions require the waiver to be in writing. 71 For states
that follow the RUPA, a change in the liability status by agreement is an extraordinary matter that
requires the unanimous vote of all partners. 72 But some states require a mere majority vote. 73 The
waiver of limited liability can take the form of an affirmation that the contribution provision
survives the conversion into an LLP, a re-insertion of the provision into the partnership agreement

67

Id. See also Carter G. Bishop, The Limited Liability Partnership Amendments to the Uniform Partnership Act (1994),
53 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 101, 109 (Nov.1997).
68
RUPA supra note 10 at § 306 (1) (“This subsection applies: (1) despite anything inconsistent in the partnership
agreement that existed immediately before the vote or consent required to become a limited liability partnership under
Section 901(b).”), and Comment, Subsection (c)(1)--The main part of Subsection (c) overrides contribution
obligations under this act. Paragraph 1 overrides contribution obligations created by the partnership agreement.”)
69
Id. at § 901(b) (“The terms and conditions on which a partnership becomes a limited liability partnership must be
approved by the affirmative vote or consent necessary to amend the partnership agreement except, in the case of a
partnership agreement that expressly addresses obligations to contribute to the partnership, the affirmative vote or
consent necessary to amend those provisions.”).
70
Subcomm. on the Prototype Ltd. Liab. P’ship Agreement Formed Under the Unif. P’ship Act (1997) Comm. on
P’ships and Unincorporated Bus. Org., Section of Bus. Law, A.B.A., Prototype Partnership Agreement for a Limited
Liability Partnership Formed Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), 58 The Business Lawyer 689, 717 n. 79
(Feb. 2003), citing Official Comment to 306(c) (“Although the liability shield protections of Section 306(c) may be
modified in part or in full in a partnership agreement (and by way of private contractual guarantees), the modifications
must constitute an intentional waiver of the liability protections.”)).
71
See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 16306(d).
72
RUPA supra note 10 at § 401(k) (“A difference arising as to a matter in the ordinary course of business of a
partnership may be decided by a majority of the partners. An act outside the ordinary course of business of a
partnership and an amendment to the partnership agreement may be undertaken only with the affirmative vote or
consent of all the partners.”).
73
See, e.g., N.Y. Partnership Law supra note 28 at §26(d) and Cal. Corp. Code §16306(d).
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upon or after the LLP registration, 74 or a partner-to-partner contract for indemnification and
contribution to render the obligation personal to the partners as opposed to the partnership. 75 In
addition, individual partners may undertake to be guarantors of the partnership’s debt and subject
themselves to personal liability under the law of guaranty. 76
A Narrow Interpretation of the scope of limited liability to exclude the debts owed to LLP
partners from the protection could result in partners being held personally liable for debts incurred
without their consent or participation.

Suppose an LLP has five partners, A, B, C, D, and E.

Partner A is a senior partner who has the sole authority to decide routine business matters according
to the partnership agreement. Partner A seeks an office space for the firm and receives three offers,
one of which is from Partner B who owns a few office buildings. Partner B’s offer is the best in
all aspects of the lease (rent, location, term of the lease, etc.), so Partner A signs the lease on behalf
of the partnership. There is no concern for conflict of interest in this transaction because the leased
property is not owned by Partner A, and the lease terms are most favorable to the partnership. If
the partnership becomes unprosperous and unable to pay the rent, all partners are personally liable,
including Partners C, D and E who are junior in position, insignificant in ownership, and voiceless
in the decision process. Even though the lease benefits the partnership in all aspects, the lingering
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See Subcomm. on the Prototype Ltd. Liab. P’ship Agreement supra note 70 n. 80. (“RUPA section 306(c) negates
pre-existing contribution obligations unless they are agreed to again at the time of the vote to register the partnership
as a limited liability partnership”). See also Carol J. Miller LLPs: How Limited Is Limited Liability? 53 J. MO. B.
154, 158. (“Certainly if any provision requiring contribution were added to the partnership agreement after a
partnership filed as a LLP, such provision would work to undermine the scope of the LLP liability shield. Even internal
partnership agreements designed to partially reinstate the duty of contribution in an LLP may place the partners at
risk.”).
75
See RUPA supra note 10 at § 306(c)(1) cmt. Effect of LLP Status on Relations Inter Se the Partners (“Paragraph 1
does not, however, override contribution and indemnification requirements running directly from partner to partner.
These obligations are not obligations of the LLP but rather personal to each partner. If such obligations remain in the
partnership agreement, they might disable the shield as to partnership liability arising from the misconduct of a
partner.”).
76
See, e.g., N.Y. Partnership Law supra note 28 at §26(d) (“Nothing in this section shall in any way affect or impair
the ability of a partner to act as a guarantor or surety for, provide collateral for or otherwise be liable for, the debts,
obligations or liabilities of a registered limited liability partnership.”), and identical provisions of Cal. Corp. Code §
16306(h).
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personal liability may be an overarching concern for Partners C, D and E, so if given a choice, they
likely would have preferred to lease from outside landlords. Similarly, in Ederer v. Gursky, the
three partners who jointly held 15% interest in the partnership likely would have preferred for the
partnership to finance its operation by borrowing from outside creditors rather than postponing the
distribution to Ederer, even though the latter option was least costly to the partnership. 77
The problem of inadvertent personal liability under the Narrow Interpretation of limited
liability is more conspicuous in large partnerships that typically entrust routine business matters to
management committees composed of just a handful of partners. 78 For example, Winston &
Strawn LLP, an international law firm headquartered in Chicago, has about 400 partners
worldwide. It is managed by an executive committee of 27 partners. 79 The notion that all partners
actively participate in managing the partnership’s affairs does not reflect reality. Yet, under the
Narrow Interpretation, the remaining hundreds of partners could have lingering personal liability
over which they have little or no control.
C. Inconsistency with the “Clean Severance” Ideal
The Narrow Interpretation is incompatible with the RUPA’s desire to achieve a clean
severance in the relationship of partners who withdraw from the partnership and the remaining
partners. 80 Such a desire is reflected in RUPA’s open recognition that a partnership is an entity
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See supra p. 7-10 for discussion on Ederer v. Gursky.
See Patrick J. McKenna & David J. Parnell, The State of Law Firm Leadership, THOMPSON REUTERS LEGAL
EXECUTIVE INST. P. 4, https://images.ask.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/Web/TRlegalUS/%7B55b653fc-cca74d3f-a7e2-b98fd8618445%7D_State_of_Law_Firm_Leadership.pdf (“Is there an “elected” Board/Executive
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See Winston & Strawn Announces New Executive Committee Members, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, (Sep. 5, 2018),
https://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/winston-and-strawn-announces-new-executive-committeemembers.html.
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For discussion of the authors of the UNIF. P’SHIP. ACT (2013) intent for a clean severance, see Robert W. Hillman,
RUPA and Former Partners: Cutting the Gordian Knot With Continuing Partnership Entities, 58 L. & and Contemp.
Prob.s 7, 8 (Spring 1995).
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distinct from its partners, 81 its generous designation as “dissociation events” as opposed to
“dissolution events” when one or more, but not all, partners withdraw from the partnership so that
the business can continue, 82 its mandate that the partnership purchase the withdrawing partners’
interests within a time limit unless a delay is justified by the wrongful nature of the withdrawal, 83
and its broad indemnity provision that requires the partnership to indemnify a withdrawing partner
against all liabilities incurred during the partner’s tenure with the partnership, regardless of
whether the liabilities are known before or after the dissociation. 84
The Narrow Interpretation of limited liability would create a lasting tie between a
dissociated partner with the remaining partners due to the conversion of the former into a creditor
if his buyout is delayed until the end of the partnership’s term or undertaking. The creditor status
is embodied in RUPA § 701(f) that permits the partnership to make an offer for payment, stating
the time of payment, “the amount and type of security for payment”, and “other terms and
conditions of the obligation”(emphasis added). 85 The Narrow Interpretation renders the buyout
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RUPA supra note 10 at § 201(a).
Id. at § 601.
83
Id. at § 701(a) (“If a person is dissociated as a partner without the dissociation resulting in a dissolution and winding
up of the partnership business under Section 801, the partnership shall cause the person’s interest in the partnership to
be purchased for a buyout price determined pursuant to subsection (b)”), RUPA 701(e) (“If no agreement for the
purchase of the interest of a person dissociated as a partner is reached not later than 120 days after a written demand
for payment, the partnership shall pay, or cause to be paid, in money to the person the amount the partnership estimates
to be the buyout price and accrued interest, reduced by any offsets and accrued interest under subsection (c)”), and
RUPA Section 701(h)(“A person that wrongfully dissociates as a partner before the expiration of a definite term or
the completion of a particular undertaking is not entitled to payment of any part of the buyout price until the expiration
of the term or completion of the undertaking, unless the person establishes to the satisfaction of the court that earlier
payment will not cause undue hardship to the business of the partnership. A deferred payment must be adequately
secured and bear interest.”).
84
Id. at § 701(h).
85
Id. at § 701(f) provides: (“If a deferred payment is authorized under subsection (h), the partnership may tender a
written offer to pay the amount it estimates to be the buyout price and accrued interest, reduced by any offsets under
subsection (c), stating the time of payment, the amount and type of security for payment, and the other terms and
conditions of the obligation.”) See also Hillman supra note 80 at 24 (“The result of deferring a buyout may be
particularly harsh because RUPA eliminates the UPA's profits-or-interest election, which means not only that the
wrongfully (that is, prematurely) dissociating partner is liable for damages, but also that the former partner effectively
converts from an equity participant in the partnership to a creditor (perhaps for the long term) of the partnership
venture”).
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debt a personal liability of the remaining partners that could last beyond the dissolution of the
partnership. Moreover, the potential personal liability could in turn induce the remaining partners
to forego their statutory postponement right and devote vital resources toward the consummation
of the buyout, even at the cost of risking the financial soundness of the partnership. This defeats
RUPA’s intent to minimize disruptions that wrongful dissociations can cause the partnership
through adding the postponement provision, which is one of the marked changes from RUPA’s
predecessor statue. 86
D. Inconsistency with the Law of Guaranty
A guaranty (or guarantee) is a promise to answer for the debt of another person if that
person defaults. The guarantor is jointly and severally liable on the debt, and may be sued under
the same terms as the principal obligor. 87 The validity of a guaranty is governed by the Statute of
Frauds, which requires the guaranty to be in writing and signed by the guarantor. 88 The writing
must show an unequivocal intent to guarantee the obligation and contain a clear description of the
obligation being guaranteed.

89

A guaranty contract cannot be extended by implication or

interpretation and must be strictly construed. 90 In Addy v. Myers, 91 the Supreme Court of North
Dakota refused to impose a guaranty-based personal liability on two members of an LLC because
it found no evidence of writing to support the allegation of a guaranty. 92 The court stated that the
managing members of the LLC who signed the line of credit with a bank as the guarantors could
86

The predecessor of RUPA supra note 10 is the Uniform Partnership Act (1914). Section 38 (1) of that statute
requires the partnership to pay the buyout price in cash without delay unless the partnership agreement provides
otherwise.
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Ford v. Darwin, 767 S.W.2d 851, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 426 (Tex. App. Dallas Sept. 6, 1989), reh’g denied.
88
N.E.N.H., L.L.C. v. Broussard-Baehr Holdings, L.L.C. 142 So.3d 91 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. May 14, 2014); In re
Gonzalez , 410 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2009).
89
Comar Marine, Corp. v. Raider Marine Logistics, L.L.C., 792 F.3d 564, 578 (5th Cir. July 6, 2015); Material
Partnerships, Inc. v. Ventura, 102 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2003).
90
Apex Bank v. Thompson, 826 S.E.2d 162 (Ga. App. 2019), O'Brien Bros.' P’ship, LLP v. Plociennik, A.2d 692
(Vt. Sept. 28, 2007).
91
Addy v. Myers, 616 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. Aug. 31, 2000).
92
Id. at 362.
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only seek recourse against the LLC but not the non-signing members individually.

93

The guaranty must also be supported by consideration, either in the form of a benefit to the
guarantor or a detriment to the promisee. 94 In Lyons v. DBHI, LLC, 95 an employee of the debtor
signed a personal guaranty on a previous loan between the debtor and a lender. The debtor intended
to transfer his business to the employee but the transfer did not consummate. The employee
appeared to have signed a personal guaranty at his own initiation without demand from the lender.
When the debtor defaulted on the loan and the lender sought to enforce the guaranty against the
employee, the court refused to uphold the guaranty on the ground that it was unsupported by
consideration. 96
The Narrow Interpretation of limited liability will result in an unus pro omnibus situation
where a guaranty from one LLP partner virtually results in guaranties from all partners. For
example, the managing partner of an LLP obtains a $10 million loan on behalf of the partnership
and personally guarantees the loan at the insistence of the lender. The lender also seeks personal
guaranties from the other partners, but they refuse. When the LLP defaults on the loan, the lender
enforces the guaranty against managing partner. If the managing partner repays the loan, he obtains
a claim against the partnership by subrogation. 97 That means the managing partner now becomes
a creditor of the partnership who can enforce the rights of the lender under the terms of the original
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Id. at 363.
Good v. Martin, 95 U.S. 90 (Oct. 1, 1877 ); Cardinal Health 110, Inc. v. Cyrus Pharmaceutical, LLC, 560 F.3d
894 (8th Cir. Mar. 31, 2009); Material P’ships, Inc. v. Ventura, 102 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App. Hous. 14th Dist.
2003), Fruehauf Corp. v. McIntire, 1969 408 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. Mar. 19).
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Lyons v. DBHI, LLC, No. CIV.A. U607-12-063, 2010 WL 335634, at *1 (Del. Com. Pl. Jan. 27, 2010).
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Id. See also Kansas City Live Block 125 Retail, LLC v. Bhakta, 476 S.W.3d 326 (Mo. Ct. of App. 2015) ; AXA
Inv. Managers UK Ltd. v. Endeavor Cap. Mgmt, LLC, 890 F.Supp.2d 373 (S,D,N.Y. Aug. 24, 2012); Tower Inv.,
LLC v. 111 E. Chestnut Consultants, Inc., 371 Ill.App.3d 1019 ( Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 14, 2007).
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See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 27(1) (AM. LAW INST.). (“Upon total satisfaction of the
underlying obligation, the secondary obligor is subrogated to all rights of the obligee with respect to the underlying
obligation to the extent that performance of the secondary obligation contributed to the satisfaction.”)
94
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loan. 98 He can force a contribution from other partners when the partnership’s assets are
insufficient to pay his debt. In terms of liability, that is the same result as if all partners had
guaranteed the loan despite the other partners’ explicit refusal to do so. From the lender’s
perspective, obtaining a guaranty from one LLP partner would provide him with almost the same
level of security as if all partners had guaranteed the loan.

IV Procedural Impediments to Enforcing Personal Liability
A. Due Process Requirement
Enforcing personal liability against partners of an LLP that engages in interstate commerce
may face procedural impediments. Due process requires the defendant in any lawsuit to have
minimum contacts with the state in which the lawsuit is adjudicated. 99 Minimum contacts require
the defendant to have “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State,” 100 resulting from actions by the defendant himself that create a “substantial
connection” with the forum state. 101 Due process intends to give “a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”102 The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that mere ownership of shares of a corporation does not satisfy the
due process requirement of minimum contacts, even when the corporation is incorporated in the

98

See Id. at § 28. See also Brian D. Hulse, After the Guarantor Pays: The Uncertain Equitable Doctrines of
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forum state.

103

This is so even if a shareholder’s liability is phrased in terms of liability to the

corporation that is incorporated in the forum state. 104
In the influential article entitled Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural
Lens, Professor Janet Cooper Alexander argued that minimum contacts cannot be satisfied merely
by the fact the defendant is insured by a company that does business in the forum state, even though
the latter is obligated to join the defense. 105 She also argued that due process cannot be satisfied
by suing all shareholders as a defendant class unless each shareholder individually has minimum
contacts with the forum state. 106 Citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 107 Professor Alexander
distinguished cases in which plaintiffs are suing as a class from those in which the defendants are
sued as a class. In the former cases, the forum state may have jurisdiction even though some
members of the class lack minimum contacts because “an adverse judgment merely extinguishes
a claim that would have been ‘uneconomical to litigate individually,’ rather than subjecting the
plaintiff to ‘coercive or punitive remedies’ including a judgment for damages.” 108 In the limited
situations where owners of a business enterprise are subject to personal jurisdiction for liabilities
of the enterprise, the personal jurisdiction is premised on their participation in the control of the
enterprise or otherwise involved in the decision-making process. This is the case for the personal
liability of controlling shareholders under the piecing-corporate-veil doctrine. 109
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Although Professor Alexander’s discussion of the procedural impediments to personal
liability under the due process requirement was made in the context of corporate shareholders,
such impediments also exist for large partnerships operating in multiple jurisdictions. According
to 2019 data, the top fifteen U.S. law firms have 350 – 1,500 partners and multiple offices scattered
across the country. 110 If a New York partner is sued for malpractice by a New York client on a real
estate transaction that took place in New York, and the partner pays the entire amount of damage
out of his own pocket, can he bring a lawsuit in New York against a partner residing in California
for contribution if the latter is neither a member of the firm’s management committee nor
connected with New York personally except for his ownership in the firm? Similarly, if a New
York partner leases an office space to the law firm’s New York office, can he sue a Nevada partner
in a New York court for personal liability when the law firm defaults on the rent? In absence of
the partner’s control of the partnership’s business or otherwise involved in the decision-making
process, due process likely bars such claims.
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To enforce the personal liability against all

partners, the creditor-partner would have to bring a lawsuit in multiple jurisdictions. Simultaneous
lawsuits are cost-prohibitive and time-consuming. “For practical purposes, the law would be
unenforceable.” 112 The difficulty of collecting from small partners results in large partners being
targeted for collection, violating the principle that each unit of equity interest in the partnership be
accorded equal value. 113
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B. Bankruptcy Trustee’s Standing
Can a creditor-partner of an LLP circumvent the requirement for minimum contacts by
forcing the partnership into bankruptcy and resorting to the nationwide jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court? It is settled law that creditors of the partnership cannot pursue individual
partners directly when the partnership is in a bankruptcy proceeding – only a trustee for the
bankrupt estate has such a power. 114 Under § 723 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee of a general
partnership that is in a Chapter 7 proceeding has standing to sue partners for contribution “to the
extent that under applicable nonbankruptcy law such general partner is personally liable for such
deficiency.” 115 Arguably, LLP partners are essentially general partners in regard to debts owed to
co-partners if the state’s partnership law imposes personal liability for such debts. However, the
trustee can sue individual partners only for debts owed to the partnership. 116 Courts have not had
an opportunity to determine whether a personal liability of LLP partners for debts owed to fellow
partners is a liability to the individual partners rather than to the partnership. In the corporate
shareholder setting, some courts have held that a bankruptcy trustee has no standing to reach the
assets of the corporation’s shareholders who have been found personally liable for corporation’s
indebtedness under the alter ego doctrine. 117 In terms of the trustee’s standing, there is a plausible
analogy between corporate shareholders and LLP partners. Both situations involve debts owed by
the enterprise, a deficiency in the enterprise’s assets to satisfy the debts, an establishment of

that, in any public corporation, there are enough large shareholders to make it worthwhile for plaintiffs to pursue them
for pro rata excess liability. The resulting regime would still contravene the principle … that the expected value of
shares should be the same for all holders in order to preserve market liquidity.).
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11 U.S.C.A. §723(a) (West 2020) (“ If there is a deficiency of property of the estate to pay in full all claims which
are allowed in a case under this chapter concerning a partnership and with respect to which a general partner of the
partnership is personally liable, the trustee shall have a claim against such general partner to the extent that under
applicable nonbankruptcy law such general partner is personally liable for such deficiency.”).
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11 U.S.C.A. § 323(a) (“The trustee in a case under this title is the representative of the estate”). Metropolitan
Creditors' Tr. v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, 463 F.Supp.2d 1193 (E.D. Wash. Nov.14, 2006).
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See, e.g., In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co., Inc., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. Apr. 14, 1987) ; Shaoxing County
Huayue Import & Export v. Bhaumik, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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personal liability on the part of the enterprise’s owners under state laws, and the bankruptcy
trustee’s endeavor to garner the personal assets of the owners to be forwarded to the creditors. The
precedents of alter ego cases at least highlight the uncertainty of the law on this issue. Moreover,
even if the trustee has the standing to sue individual partners in Chapter 7 liquidations, he has no
right to sue in Chapter 11 re-organizations. This is because the Bankruptcy Code has explicitly
limited the trustee’s power under § 723 to Chapter 7 cases. 118 Forcing the partnership into a
Chapter 7 liquidation may result in a flash sale of partnership assets, hurting the interest of all
partners, including the creditor-partner who seeks for a repayment of his loans.
C. A Partner’s Standing to Petition for an Involuntary Bankruptcy
There is also a substantial doubt on an LLP partner’s standing to force the partnership into
bankruptcy. Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 119 permits fewer than all general partners to
petition for an involuntary bankruptcy of the partnership, but 303(a) denies the same standing for
shareholders of corporations. 120 The question boils down to whether an LLP is regarded as a
corporation or a general partnership for purposes of this section. Section 101 (9)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code defines “corporation” to include a “partnership association organized under a
law that makes only the capital subscribed responsible for the debts for such association.” In In re
Beltway Law Group, LLP, 121 the bankruptcy court examined this definition against the partnership
statute of the District of Columbia that mimicked the provision of the RUPA on LLP partners’
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limited liability and concluded that the partnership statute had removed all personal liabilities of
LLP partners. As a result, the court held that an LLP should be treated as a corporation and hence
its partners did not have the standing to force the partnership into a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The
court reasoned that § 303 was for protecting general partners who were exposed to personal
liability by enabling them to preserve the value of partnership assets through bankruptcy. The court
found such a purpose lacking in the context of LLPs because it believed that the plain language of
the partnership statute suggested a corporate-style limited liability. 122 The same conclusion was
reached in In Re Rambo Imaging, LLP.

123

Both decisions were premised on the court’s

interpretation of the partnership statute as conferring a broad protection against personal liability
for LLP partners. Arguably, if the LLP statute is modified to explicitly endorse the Narrow
Interpretation of limited liability, the bankruptcy court might be willing to reverse its decisions
and grant the standing to a creditor-partner. Until that modification happens, the law as it stands
today denies such a standing.

V Contradictions to Accepted Wisdoms of Law-Making
A. Good Law as Gap-Filler for Private Ordering
People may argue that given the ability of partners to negotiate for a different contract
among themselves than the default statutory provisions, or simply file the LLP registration with a
state such as California that provides for a broader liability protection, 124 a default rule on liability
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does not matter much in reality. 125 Such a proposition turns law-making on its head. The ability of
contractual parties to deviate through private ordering or forum shopping does not justify
promulgating bad laws to begin with. 126 Besides, partnerships often operate under an established
hierarchical structure that features the dominance of a few senior partners. When new partners are
admitted, they are given the choice of either accepting the status quo or forgoing partner status
completely. The latter is hardly a viable choice because the partner status is the result of years of
sacrificial hard labor coming to fruition, a symbol of achievement that few people are willing to
risk losing for a chance of managerial equality. Bargaining occurs most likely in small partnerships
with just a handful of partners.

127

For large partnerships (e.g., corporate law firms) with

concentrated managerial authorities, the bargaining right by new and subordinated partners is
fanciful but titular. 128 In addition, many partners do not know the exact boundary of the law and
the need to contract around it. 129 Partners often commence their ventures without a formal
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partnership agreement. 130 Even if an agreement is signed, it typically regulates the long-term
relationship rather than showcasing the bargains in any specific transaction. The lack of any
agreement and the inability of partners to anticipate every contingency require the law to fill the
gaps with default rules. The role of the partnership statute as the gap-filler is explicitly recognized
by the drafters of RUPA. 131
B. Guiding Principles for Setting Default Rules
What are the guiding principles for setting default rules? First, most scholars argue that
good default rules should reflect the wishes of the majority of interested parties if contracting were
efficient. 132 This “majoritarian intent” approach is justified on the notion of efficiency because it
saves transaction costs by reducing the number of issues that the parties need to bargain over.133
This approach is seen in RUPA’s provision on how partners should share profits and losses in the
absence of an agreement. 134 It has also been endorsed by courts that, in construing ambiguous
contracts, inquire about how a reasonable person (i.e., a person representative of the majority

unexpected happens. The great bulk of society relies, without realizing it, on whatever default rule the legal system
provides.”).
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sensitivity and intelligence) would have intended to achieve through the disputed contractual
provisions. 135 Second, to the extent that incomplete contracts can be attributed to the withholding
of superior information by one party, the disclosure of which would lead to a utility-enhancing
outcome for both parties, it has been argued that the default rules should be set against the informed
party so that he has an incentive to bargain around it, disclosing valuable information in the
negotiation process. 136 For example, when a sales contract fails to provide for the quantity of goods
subject to the transaction, the default rule should set the quantity to be zero (i.e., invalidate the
contract) so that the party that values the contract higher has an incentive to specify a quantity exante. 137 Third, default rules should strive to minimize agency costs when it is difficult to monitor
the agent’s conducts. 138 That explains why corporate statutes set elaborate default rules to restrict
directors’ self-dealings. 139 The law presumes that such transactions are unfair to the corporation
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unless the directors satisfy the burden of proving otherwise. 140 Fourth, the law should protect
parties’ reasonable expectations from their bargains and prevent a stronger bargaining party from
unfairly taking advantage of the weaker party. The duty of good faith of fair dealing that cannot
be eliminated by partnership agreements exemplifies this paternalistic approach. 141 Fifth, default
rules should impose the cost of harm on those who are most capable of bearing the cost. 142 That is
why the law imposes a duty to mitigate damages from the breach of a contract on the nonbreaching
party. The nonbreaching party’s failure to mitigate results in a reduction of the monetary damages
that he is otherwise entitled to receive. 143 Sixth, default rules should induce optimal risk-taking by
business participants by imposing a level of liability that is neither overly lenient nor excessively
punitive. 144 Seventh, default rules should internalize the cost of harm within the business entities
that have caused the harm rather than spreading it to every corner of the society. 145 This rationale
has been invoked to justify a limited liability for at least publicly held corporations whose
shareholder base constantly evolves with share transfers. People who are shareholders at the time

(suggesting that a broad prohibition against self-dealing for public companies is justified by the limited ability of
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a cause of action accrues against a corporation may have sold their shares and severed all ties with
the corporation at the time the corporation is found liable. 146
C. Shortfalls of the Narrow Interpretation of Limited Liability
The Narrow Interpretation of limited liability is incompatible with the principles of lawmaking discussed in the previous section.
First, from the perspective of setting the rules that reflect the preferences of interested
parties, research has shown that risk aversion leads to entrepreneurs’ preference for limited
liability. 147 Indeed the preference for limited liability fueled the development of joint stock
companies in the 19th century. 148 In 2019, the authors of this paper conducted an experiment in
which the participants were forty-two second-year and third-year law students enrolled in a
business law class at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. The participants had learned
about attributes of general partnerships, including the joint and several liability among partners,
but they were unfamiliar with limited liability partnerships. The participants were given a statute
resembling the provision of RUPA § 306 (c) on limited liability. They were asked to take on the
role of partners of an LLP that faced a financing decision: a loan at 3% interest rate from a fellow
partner versus a loan at 4% interest rate from an outside creditor. The two loans were otherwise
identical. The participants were asked to choose one of the loans in two scenarios: (1) limited
liability applies to both loans, and (2) limited liability applies to only the loan from the outside
creditor. In the first scenario, twenty-six out of forty-two participants chose the 3% loan from a
fellow partner, whereas in the second scenario, only five out of forty-two participants chose the
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loan from the partner. The difference was statistically significant at 5% level. 149 In a follow-up
question, the LLP was described as experiencing financial difficulties. The participants were asked
to choose between (1) dissolving the business, taking no distribution from the partnership because
all assets would be used to satisfy creditors, but incurring no personal liability for any unsatisfied
debts, and (2) taking a loan from a partner at a low interest rate to pay off existing debts and
continuing the business, but incurring personal liability if the partnership was to default on the
loan. The first option was selected in thirty-nine out of forty-two answers. These results suggest
that most LLP partners strongly prefer limited liability even though it means they would incur a
slightly higher interest cost or close the business completely.
Second, from the perspective of setting the default rules against an informed party to elicit
his disclosure of information, a partner who extends credit to the partnership is informed about the
terms of the loan and its likely impact on the partnership’s financial condition. He is better
informed about the likelihood of the partnership’s default than his fellow partners who are not
privy to the negotiations and who may not even know about the existence of the loan. Thus, the
default rule of liability should be set against the creditor-partner to incentivize him to explicitly
negotiate the issue of personal liability with the partnership and other partners. In the process of
this negotiation, the other partners are alerted of the risk of unlimited liability and given an
opportunity to evaluate the terms of the loan against that risk.
Third, from the perspective of agency costs, the actual difficulty in monitoring the conducts
of managing partners in a partnership with concentrated authorities contradicts the traditional
notion of mutual agency upon which personal liability was justified. 150 Currently partnership law
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seeks to control the agency problem arising from self-dealing transactions of the managing partners
through imposing a duty of loyalty that prevents any partner from acting adversely to the interest
of the partnership. 151 Judicial scrutiny over self-dealing transactions has focused on the fairness of
the terms of the transactions. Terms at the prevailing market rates are generally upheld by courts
in absence of any flagrant evidence suggesting that the transactions are incompatible with the
partnership’s strategic goals or financial conditions. 152 Under the Narrow Interpretation of limited
liability, a transaction that is fair in its terms and concordant with the partnership’s overall interest
may nonetheless be “adverse” to the interest of the majority of the partners given their strong
aversion to personal liability. The management’s self-dealings that sow the seed for future personal
liabilities would present a thorny agency problem for the partnership law to contend with. Can
the partnership law solve the problem by prohibiting all self-dealings unless the partnership
agreement permits otherwise? Such a broad restriction prevents the partnership from taking
advantage of opportunities whose merits may indeed override the concern for personal liability. In
addition, as discussed earlier in this paper, an ex-ante authorization is likely a boilerplate provision
in the partnership agreement which many partners are powerless to gainsay given the inequality in
their bargaining powers. Can the partnership law install procedural safeguards such as requiring at
least the majority vote of the partners before any self-dealing can occur? Such a deal-specific
approval procedure is likely cumbersome and disruptive. Imagine a situation in which Baker &
McKenzie, one of the biggest law firms with more than one thousand partners and ten offices in
the U.S. alone, looks for a storage place in New York for its backup office equipment. If a New
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York partner owns a place ideal for this purpose and offers it to the firm for a discounted rent,
should the firm seek a vote of all partners, including those located in California, Florida, Illinois,
Texas, etc. before accepting the deal? Likewise, should all partners vote before the firm’s Miami,
Florida office retains the catering service of another partnership or an LLC in which one of the
firm’s partners owns a major interest? Arguably the firm can prevent the triviality by specifying
a transaction threshold amount beyond which all partners are given a right to vote. But fixing the
adequate threshold may itself be a challenge because adequacy is in the eye of the beholder – a
wealthy partner may view $1 million as a good trigger for a firm-wide voting whereas a less
affluent partner may demand a much lower threshold. A broad liability shield irrespective of the
status of the creditors avoids this type of agency problem. It imposes the burden to negotiate for a
deviation on self-dealing partners who, in the least, have an option to abandon the transaction if
negotiation is unsuccessful. A broad liability shield aligns with the existing paradigm of
partnership fiduciary duty by permitting self-dealing transactions to occur if they pass the courts’
fairness probe, without forcing a calamitous consequence of personal liability on less equal
partners.
Fourth, a Narrow Interpretation of limited liability, as endorsed by Ederer v. Gursky, is
incongruous with the reasonable expectation of LLP partners who rely on partnership statutes that
model after the RUPA on limited liability. As part of the experiment discussed earlier in this
paper, 153 the participants were asked to read RUPA § 306(c) and answer whether it calls for
personal liability of partners when the LLP defaults on a $3 million loan from (1) an outside
creditor, and (2) a fellow partner. In the first scenario, forty out of forty-two participants answered
“No” to personal liability; in the second scenario, thirty-six out of forty-two participants answered
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“No.” The two ratios are statistically indifferent at 5% significance level. 154 The slight difference
was possibly due to some participants’ familiarity with the decision in Ederer v. Gursky. 155 This
experiment shows that most people do not distinguish, based on the statutory provision, debts owed
to partners from those owed to outsiders for the purpose of limited liability. Such indifference is
also reflected in the advices that lawyers provide on their websites regarding LLPs. 156

The

Narrow Interpretation of limited liability, if widely followed, would render the plain language of
RUPA § 306 (c) profoundly misleading.
Fifth, from the perspective of allocating liabilities to those better positioned to bear the cost
of harm, some scholars have argued that limited liability is inappropriate at least for tort cases
where victims are hapless individuals typically impuissant to bear the consequences of the
injury. 157 Whether or not limited liability suits tort cases is beyond the scope of this paper, but to
the extent tort liability continues to be limited under partnership statutes, 158 the Narrow
Interpretation of the liability shield would result in injured partners being treated more favorably
than outside victims in terms of damage recovery. If both a partner and a client are hit by a fallen
chandelier in the partnership’s office, and the partnership lacks sufficient assets to pay for the
damage awards, the Narrow Interpretation allows the partner to recover more by pursuing personal
liabilities against other partners while the client cannot. This difference is nonsensical in light of
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the fact the partner is an insider who is privy to information on the partnership’s financial
conditions and insurance coverage. He is better positioned than the client to protect himself from
mishaps like this by, for example, purchasing more insurance on his own. The same argument
applies to a contractual setting as well - a partner who extends loans or services to the partnership
is better informed about the partnership’s risk of default than is an outside creditor and hence
should not be treated preferentially in debt collection. In addition, when a creditor-partner seeks
to recover from personal assets of innocent bystander-partners who own just a miniscule
percentage of interest in the partnership, their relative ability to bear the consequence of the
partnership’s default is not immediately clear.
Sixth, in terms of setting the liability level to induce an optimal risk-taking, some scholars
have argued that limited liability creates a moral hazard by allowing the owners of the business to
shift the costs to the general public, and hence leads to excessive risk-taking, thin capitalization,
and inadequate liability insurance. 159 Research has shown that the rate of medical malpractice in
New York hospitals was 30% less than what it would have been were there no liability for medical
malpractice. 160 However, research has also shown that when bankruptcy is built into consideration
as a decision-maker chooses risk exposures, any gain from excessive risk is more than offset by
the higher probability of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy aversion translates into a preference for safer
prospects b y risk-neutral individuals. 161 While it is always beneficial for a decisionmaker to
choose higher risk when his initial wealth is zero, close to zero or negative so as to gain a chance
at resurrection, his chosen risk exposure declines when endowed with substantial wealth that can
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be lost in bankruptcy. 162 In any case, if personal liability prompts the partnership to reduce risk
exposures, there is no reason to create such an incentive only when the counterparty to the
transaction is a partner as opposed to an outsider.
Seventh, cost internalization also counsels against the Narrow Interpretation of limited
liability. Although selling partnership interest is more involved than simply submitting a sell order
on the website of a leading stock brokerage firm, as is often the case for selling shares of publicly
traded corporations, dissociations from the partnership do occur from time to time either because
of partners’ voluntary decision to sever the ties, rightfully or wrongfully, or involuntary departures
such as deaths, personal bankruptcies, or expulsions. Although RUPA § 701 requires the
partnership to indemnify the departing partner for all past and future debts and obligations, 163 the
indemnification is not a release that requires the consent of the person holding a claim; 164 it merely
obligates the partnership to reimburse the dissociated partner should he be found liable for
activities during his tenure at the partnership. There are ample cases in which partners were held
liable, under the joint-and-several-liability framework of general partnerships, in lawsuits brought
years after their severance from the partnership. A case often cited to illustrate the lasting threat of
liability is Redman v. Walters. 165 The defendant was an ex-partner of a law firm retained by the
plaintiff in a lawsuit brought against a third person. The plaintiff’s dealings with the law firm were
exclusively through another attorney, and the defendant never met the plaintiff, nor communicated
in any way with her or received any compensation for any services purportedly rendered on her
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behalf. The defendant later dissociated from the firm and practiced elsewhere. The law firm
continued representing the client in the lawsuit until four years after the defendant’s departure
when the lawsuit was dismissed due to the failure of the plaintiff to bring it to trial within five
years. The plaintiff brought a malpractice lawsuit against the firm, its existing and previous
partners, including the defendant. The California Court of Appeals refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s
action against the defendant, reasoning that “[a]n individual partner's liability in such a case will
not be terminated except by performance of an agreement creating the liability, or by express or
implied consent of the other contracting party that he need not so perform.” 166 Similarly in
Thompson by Thompson v. Gilmore, 167 the plaintiff sued a law firm’s ex-partners for malpractice
which caused the plaintiff’s wrongful death action on behalf of a deceased relative to be time
barred by the Statute of Limitations. The law firm was dissolved by the time of the malpractice
lawsuit, but the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the dissolution did not relieve ex-partners who
did not work on the plaintiff’s case from vicarious liability.168 Consistent with these precedents,
under the Narrow Interpretation of limited liability for LLP partners, a partner would be under the
shadow of potential vicarious liabilities long after his dissociation from the partnership. The
concern about such externality has been a compelling argument in favor of limited liability for
shareholders of corporations. 169
VI Conclusion
Does limited vicarious liability apply to LLP partners when the obligations (arising from
torts or contracts) are owed to a fellow partner? There is a split of authority among the few courts
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that have dealt with this issue. The New York Court of Appeals denied the applicability and the
California Court of Appeals upheld it, based on similarly worded and structured LLP statutes of
their respective jurisdictions that model after the RUPA. The issue is profoundly important as it
matters to the fundamental decisions of where to register a business and in what form the venture
should be organized – people who fear personal liability may choose to either form an LLC or
register an LLP in a jurisdiction such as California. The issue is also pertinent to the managerial
style and decision-making process of LLPs – the lingering personal liability may prompt partners
to insist on unanimous votes even on matters that are otherwise ordinary and trivial. The issue also
likely impacts the partnership’s substantive business decisions – partners may vote to pay off debts
owed fellow partners at the expense of outside creditors and business expansion opportunities.
New York’s Narrow Interpretation of limited liability has eluded the attention of lawyers who
continue to advise clients on the similarity in the liability shield of LLPs and corporations/LLCs.
This paper shows that the Narrow Interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative intent
behind the enactment of LLP statutes to provide a uniform liability framework for corporate
shareholders, LLC members and LLP partners. In partnerships with a hierarchical management
structure, the Narrow Interpretation causes inadvertent personal liabilities that contradicts the
statutory requirement that the liability shield can only be waived by partners knowingly and
intentionally. The Narrow Interpretation results in lasting ties between dissociated partners and the
remaining partners that survive the dissolution of the partnership, in contravention to the “clean
severance” ideal of the partnership statutes. The Narrow Interpretation leads to an uno pro omnibus
situation in which one partner’s provision of guaranty results in the same personal liability as if all
partners have guaranteed the obligation, including those partners who have explicitly refused to
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do so. Such a result violates the law on guaranty that requires any guaranty to be provided with
the consent of the guarantor and supported by consideration.
There are also procedural impediments to enforcing personally liabilities granted by the
Narrow Interpretation. The Due Process requirement of minimum contacts with the forum state
goes beyond a mere equity interest in the partnership that is registered in the forum state. Enforcing
personal liabilities against a large number of partners of an LLP with offices sprawling across the
country may require bringing simultaneous lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions at inhibitive costs.
The end result is selective enforcements against wealthy partners, causing disparate values of unit
interests in the partnership that depend on the partners’ personal wealth.
Although the bankruptcy court has nationwide jurisdiction, the bankruptcy trustee can only
reach assets that belong to the partnership as opposed to creditors, and only in Chapter 7
liquidations rather than Chapter 11 reorganizations. Although the Bankruptcy Code permits the
trustee to reach the assets of general partners who are personally liable for contribution to the
partnership’s debts, there is no comparable provision that applies to LLPs. However, there are
cases that have restricted the trustee’s power from reaching the assets of shareholders who are
found personally liable for the debts of the corporation under the alter ego doctrine.
There is an additional layer of uncertainty regarding an LLP partner’s standing to petition
for an involuntary Chapter 7 liquidation on behalf of the partnership. Existing cases denied such a
standing on the ground that LLP partners have no personal liability for partnership debts, so they
should be treated as corporate shareholders whose standing has been explicitly negated by the
Bankruptcy Code. How a Narrow Interpretation of limited liability will impact future cases on this
issue is yet to be seen.
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The Narrow interpretation defies widely accepted wisdoms of law-making. These wisdoms
counsel for default rules that replicate the majoritarian intent, incentivize information disclosure,
minimize agency costs, meet the reasonable expectations of concerned parties, and internalize the
cost of harm. The Narrow Interpretation undermines all the above. It treats partner-creditors more
favorably than outside creditors, even though the former are insiders who have an unobstructed
view of the full palette of the firm’s financial and operational conditions.
The Narrow Interpretation of limited liability leaves an (overlooked) hole in the shield that
is inconsistent with acknowledged legislative intents, prone to procedural challenges in
enforcement, inharmonious with settled legal doctrines, and contradictory to reasonable
expectations from reading the plain language of the partnership statute. Such an interpretation is
plainly wrong.
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